Those who expected US President Barack Obama to ignore Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and who were surprised at his calling her last March 14, should have read his speeches and other statements on foreign policy during the campaign for the 2008 US Presidential elections.
Some Filipinos repelled by eight years of Bush policies had somewhat naively thought that the election of the first black US President, whose campaign had been waged from a high moral plane, would mean fundamental shifts in US foreign policy, including a departure from the “war on terrorism” paradigm. They were wrong.
The same call linked the war on terrorism to the contentious Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which Obama declared to be “critical to the (US-Philippines) bilateral relationship and our strategic interests.” Not coincidentally was the call followed by Suzette Nicolas’ withdrawing her claim that US Marine Daniel Smith had raped her on November 1, 2005, thus defusing calls for a review and even abrogation of the Agreement.
Did the call indicate a deviation from announced Obama policies? Far from it. It was perfectly consistent with the Obama policy, or more precisely, the Obama-Biden foreign policy, which was a key element in convincing the US electorate to vote for Obama and Vice President Joseph Biden by assuaging fears over Obama’s inexperience in foreign relations and his allegedly being soft on terrorism.
The policy is anchored on three initiatives meant to address the concerns of the US electorate over safety and security: secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists and negotiate a new global ban on nuclear weapons; end the alleged threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program; and renew US diplomacy by rebuilding US alliances.
To do these, the policy emphasizes the need for diplomatic initiatives rather than the George W. Bush framework of using military power to advance US interests. In ending the Iranian “nuclear threat” (whether that threat does exist is at least debatable), Obama-Biden rejected the Bush- (Richard) Cheney plan to attack Iran by using US military facilities and troops in Iraq, and promised instead “tough, direct presidential diplomacy with Iran without preconditions,” and to “pressure Iran directly to change its troubling behavior.”
“If Iran abandons its nuclear program and support for terrorism,” the Obama-Biden policy promised, “we will offer incentives like membership in the World Trade Organization, economic investments, and a move toward normal diplomatic relations. If Iran continues its troubling behavior, we will step up our economic pressure and political isolation.”
Rebuilding US alliances would require the opening of more US missions in other countries, including “in the tough and hopeless corners of the world — particularly in Africa.” But even more fundamentally would it mean consulting with and assuring US allies and abandoning the unilateralism of the Bush years.
Securing nuclear weapons from terrorists and negotiating a “verifiable ban” on nuclear weapons would address concerns not only over nuclear proliferation but also over terrorist groups’ gaining access to nuclear arms. Note that the policy has anti-terrorism as a major plank, and is a common, if understated theme, in all three initiatives.
All three initiatives are based on an overarching principle: the willingness to talk and “to meet with the leaders of all nations, friend and foe.” The US, according to this principle, needs international support for a broad range of issues:
“Not talking doesn’t make us look tough — it makes us look arrogant, it denies us opportunities to make progress, and it makes it harder for America to rally international support for our leadership. On challenges ranging from terrorism to disease, nuclear weapons to climate change, we cannot make progress unless we can draw on strong international support.”
The Obama policy thus affirms that
1. US foreign policy is premised on defending and advancing US interests
2. To achieve that aim the US will rebuild its alliances, and talk to everyone whether friend or foe, in some cases without conditions and with the use of muscle diplomacy.
But there’s an unstated premise in the Obama policy which Americans assume to be the bedrock on which US foreign relations are firmly based: when all else fails, US military power will defend and advance US interests. The policy does emphasize diplomatic initiatives over military power. But that’s about all it does. In another speech, Obama did imply that, as an indication of how tough he can be, he would use military means to whip recalcitrant countries into line.
Did anyone expect Obama to redirect US foreign policy from the defense and enhancement of US interests, as well as to discard the anti-terrorism framework in the conduct of US foreign relations? Those who did were the only ones surprised at Obama’s call to Arroyo. After all he did say he was willing to talk to friend or foe alike, and Arroyo has been far from being a foe of US interests, which among others include assuring US prosperity and security through its continuing “world leadership” (read: dominance in land, sea, air and space).
The anti-terrorism framework remains in place in the context of this fundamental aim. As a reaction to US dominance, terrorism is after all a real threat to both US individuals as well as interests both at home and abroad. Addressing its roots rather than continuing to fight its adherents militarily would after all require abandoning the policies that have made the world what it is: a planet of great disorder and peril as a result of the vast disparities in wealth, opportunities and power US hegemony has assured and hopes it will continue to preside over. To do so would make Obama what his rivals said he would be: a radical — which, despite all else, he isn’t, and in the context of US realities, he can’t be.